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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a series of papers, Bagwell and Staiger1 have developed a comprehensive economic theory of
GATT that allows to evaluate its foundational rules. It is widely accepted that the main pillar
of GATT is the rule of reciprocity, which “refers to the ‘ideal’ of mutual changes in trade policy
that bring about equal changes in import volumes across trading partners” (BS99, p.224)2.3 An
important message of Bagwell and Staiger’s work is that “GATT’s reciprocity rule serves to mitigate
the inﬂuence of power asymmetries on negotiated outcomes” (BS00, p.47). More generally, they
argue that GATT is an approach to trade negotiations in which decisions are taken with reference
to previously agreed rules (a ‘rules-based’ approach). The natural alternative to GATT is a ‘power-
based’ approach, where agreements are reached, instead, with reference to the relative power status
of trading partners and where the negotiated outcome reﬂects power asymmetries among them.4
Therefore, GATT’s rules, and reciprocity in particular, should favor countries with a low bargaining
power relative to their stronger trading partners.
In this paper, we challenge these conclusions with a counter-example. We formulate a standard
two-sector, general equilibrium model of trade between two asymmetric countries to show that
GATT’s reciprocity rule, as formalized by Bagwell and Staiger, may exacerbate, rather than miti-
gating, power asymmetries among countries. In order to develop our argument, we ﬁrst compare
the negotiated outcome under the GATT’s rule of reciprocity with both the free trade and the
trade war. We ﬁnd that in the GATT equilibrium the weaker country (i.e., the country that is
1See, in particular, Bagwell and Staiger (1996, 1999, 2000, 2001; henceforth, BSXX). ‘GATT-Think’ in the title
of this paper refers to Bagwell and Staiger’s economic theory of GATT. It is also the title of BS00, which refers, in
turn, to the ironic label given by Krugman (1991) to the set of principles that govern trade negotiations within the
GATT-WTO.
2As noted by BS99 (p. 217), although there is no formal requirement that GATT’s negotiations conform to the
rule of reciprocity, it has been observed that governments seek, de facto, a balance of concessions. Further, the
principle of reciprocity explicitly governs the manner in which tariﬀs may be increased in the GATT’s procedures
for renegotiation. See also Dam (1970) on how reciprocity is measured in practice.
3Another pillar of GATT is the principle of non-discrimination, according to which member countries agree that
any tariﬀ applied to imports of one trading partner applies also to all other trading partners. The rule of non-
discrimination is trivially satisﬁed in the two-country model analyzed in this paper. BS99 show that in a higher
dimensional context, non-discrimination is complementary to reciprocity, since it preserves its eﬀectiveness in a
multi-country setting. In particular, they show that an agreement based on reciprocity is ‘renegotiation proof’ if
and only if it also satisﬁes the rule of non-discrimination.
4See also Jackson (1989) on this point.
2relatively more trade dependent) improves its welfare relative to the trade war, but cannot reach
the free trade welfare level. More strikingly, in the GATT equilibrium the stronger, less trade
dependent country improves its welfare relative to both the free trade and the trade war. Our
result does not depend on how large are the power asymmetries among countries. As explained
below, this means that, independent of whether the stronger country is strong enough to win a
trade war, it is always better oﬀ in the GATT equilibrium than in free trade.5
An interesting corollary of our result is that, although the more trade dependent country is,
by deﬁnition, the country that gains potentially more from trade liberalization, it is also the one
that stops ﬁrst the liberalization eﬀort along the liberalization path which conforms to reciprocity.
In other words, the weaker country is more reluctant than its trading partner to push further the
mutual tariﬀ cuts according to reciprocity, and the diﬀerence in the two countries’ willingness to
liberalize is greater the greater are the country asymmetries.
We next compare the negotiated outcome under GATT’s rule of reciprocity to the Nash bar-
gaining solution, a power-based approach to trade negotiations whose outcome reﬂects country
asymmetries in power status. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the weaker country is better oﬀ under
a power-based approach than under GATT’s reciprocity rule; conversely, the stronger country is
better oﬀ under GATT’s reciprocity rule than in the Nash bargaining solution, and its preference
for reciprocity is greater the greater is the relative trade dependence of its trading partner.
The intuition behind our results is as follows. As shown by BS99, negotiating according to
reciprocity means freezing the terms of trade at their pre-existing level. However, since in the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium the terms of trade are unfavorable to the weaker country, it
follows that under reciprocity the weaker country is constrained to negotiate tariﬀ reductions that
leave unaltered its unfavorable terms of trade. In contrast, under an eﬃcient and more ﬂexible
power-based approach, such as the Nash bargaining solution, by making non-tariﬀ concessions to
5Mayer (1981) and Kennan and Riezman (1988) have shown that, in the presence of large country asymmetries,
free trade is not in the core. This means that the stronger country’s welfare is higher in the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium than in free trade.
3its stronger trading partner, the weak country can induce it to give up its trade barriers and hence
improve its terms of trade.
Our results may help explain why developing countries have often been so reluctant to actively
participate to GATT negotiations, while being at the same time more and more willing to negotiate
direct bilateral trade agreements with industrial countries (the so-called new regionalism), which
often involve non-tariﬀ concessions on the part of developing countries in exchange for tariﬀ-free
access to the market of their more developed trading partners.6
As noted earlier, our analysis builds on Bagwell and Staiger’s economic theory of GATT.
Unlike these authors, however, we do not allow for political motivations in our representation of
government preferences, hence we stick with the traditional case in which governments maximize
national income.7 Further, in order to gain intuition on the eﬀects of the GATT’s rule of reciprocity
in the presence of asymmetric countries, we implement their approach in the context of a speciﬁc
trade model. In particular, we use the same pure exchange general equilibrium trade model as in
Kennan and Riezman (1988), since it proves tractable for our purposes and amenable to analytical
results. Our paper also shares important resemblances to Park (2000). This author, too, analyzes
the outcome of trade negotiations among asymmetric countries under diﬀerent environments. He
shows, in particular, that although negotiating a tariﬀ pair on the eﬃciency frontier or negotiating
free trade plus a direct transfer from the small to the large country are equivalent in a static game,
issues of enforcement imply that the latter arrangement is preferable from the standpoint of small
countries.8 Although Park’s approach is diﬀerent from ours, both papers provide, from diﬀerent
perspectives, an explanation for why weak countries increasingly prefer to negotiate free trade
6In recent North-South free trade agreements, such as the NAFTA or the Eastward enlargement of the EU, the
main non-tariﬀ concessions on the part of developing countries have involved liberalizing foreign direct investment,
enforcing stricter intellectual property rights, raising environmental standards and, more generally, agreeing to
change laws and regulations concerning various aspects of their internal economy. See also Park (2000) and Perroni
and Whalley (1994) on this point.
7As emphasized in BS96 (p.3), political motivations are important in shaping the eﬃciency frontier of govern-
ments, but they play no role in explaining the logic of reciprocal trade liberalization. Hence, for simplicity, we only
consider the traditional case in which governments maximize national income, which implies that free trade rests on
the eﬃciency frontier. See Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) for an investigation
of the political motivations for trade agreements.
8As in BS99, we abstract from the issue of enforcement in this paper. See Maggi (1999) for an analysis of the
role that the WTO can play in facilitating multilateral enforcement eﬀorts. See also Bond and Park (2003) on how
gradualism in trade agreements can help cooperation among asymmetric countries in a repeated tariﬀ-setting game.
4in exchange for non-tariﬀ concessions rather than tariﬀ concessions with their stronger trading
partners.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the analytical setup. Section 3 in-
vestigates the eﬀects of trade liberalization according to the GATT’s rule of reciprocity among
asymmetric countries. Section 4 compares the outcome of a rules-based approach that conforms
to reciprocity to the outcome of a power-based approach. Section 5 concludes.
2S e t u p
The basic setup is as in Kennan and Riezman (1988; henceforth KR). Consider a world of pure
exchange in which there are two countries, Home and Foreign, and two goods, X and Y .V a r i a b l e s
related to Foreign will be denoted by capital letters. The two countries share the same Cobb-
Douglas preferences, in which the two goods are weighted equally:
u = cxcy U = CXCY (1)
where c and C denote consumption. As in KR, the world endowment of each good is normalized
to one, so the world distribution of endowments (x,X,y,Y ) can be summarized by two parameters
only, γ and µ:
x = γ; y =1− µ; X =1− γ; Y = µ
In this model, each country’s autarchic price ratio equals the price ratio at which consumers choose
to consume its endowment. In particular, preferences as in (1) imply that the autarchic relative
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µ , and hence:
γ + µ>1 (2)
As noted by McLaren (1997, p. 410), a country’s relative endowment of the comparative advantage
good is an index of its trade dependence (and the reciprocal is an index of its trade independence)















is an index of Home’s relative trade dependence (or of Foreign’s relative trade independence).
Without loss of generality, we assume RTD > 1, namely, that Home is more trade dependent than
Foreign. This ratio will turn out to be crucial for our results, since it determines a country’s ability
to manipulate its terms of trade through a tariﬀ and hence the terms of trade prevailing at the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Home charges a tariﬀ at the rate (S − 1) on imports of Y ,a n dF o r e i g nc h a r g e sat a r i ﬀ at the
rate (T − 1) on imports of X. Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint allows to












+ T +1 (5)
where ex (= IX) denotes Home exports (equal to Foreign imports) of X and iy (= EY ) denotes
6Home imports (equal to Foreign exports) of Y .S o l v i n gf o rey and iy gives:
ex = IX =
µγ − ST(1 − µ)(1 − γ)
S + ST(1 − µ)+µ
(6)
iy = EY =
µγ − ST(1 − µ)(1 − γ)
T + ST(1 − γ)+γ
(7)
Using (6) and (7), the two countries’ equilibrium consumption levels are:
cx = x − ex =
γ + T(1 − µ)
1+T(1 − µ)+µ/S
; cy = y + iy =
γ + T(1 − µ)
T + TS(1 − γ)+γ
(8)
CX = X + IX =
µ + S(1 − γ)
S + ST(1 − µ)+µ
; CY = Y − EY =
µ + S(1 − γ)
1+S(1 − γ)+γ/T
(9)
Substituting (8) and (9) into (1) gives utility as a function of endowments and tariﬀ rates:
u = cxcy =
[γ + T(1 − µ)]
2
[1 + T(1 − µ)+µ/S][T + TS(1 − γ)+γ]
(10)
U = CXCY =
[µ + S(1 − γ)]
2
[S + TS(1 − µ)+µ][1+S(1 − γ)+γ/T]
(11)
In the following, (10) and (11) will be used to compare welfare under diﬀerent trade regimes. First










Further, as shown by KR (see also the appendix), this model admits an explicit solution for the


























where the latter equality follows from (3). Note that, since the world relative price of X equals 1 in
free trade9, it follows that terms of trade are undistorted in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
for RTD =1 , namely, when the two countries are perfectly symmetric. More generally, however,
the greater is the relative trade dependence of Home, the lower (and the more distorted against it
relative to the free trade) are Home’s terms of trade in the Nash equilibrium.
Substituting (13) into (10) and (11) gives the Nash equilibrium utility levels (uN and UN):
uN =
h




1+( γ(1 − µ))
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Next, we use this setup to analyze the negotiated outcome which conforms to the GATT’s rule of
reciprocity.
3 Trade Liberalization According to Reciprocity
As noted earlier, reciprocity refers to mutual tariﬀ cuts that bring about roughly equal changes
in import volumes across trading partners. A key observation of BS99 (p.224) is that, as long as
changes in import volumes are measured at existing world prices, mutual changes in trade policy
9The free trade relative price of X, PF, equals the price at which consumers choose to consume the world






8that conform to reciprocity leave the relative world price unchanged.10 Hence, we have:
PW(S,T)=PN (16)
where PW(S,T) is the world relative price of X. Equation (16) describes the Nash iso-world-
price locus, i.e., the locus of all combinations of S and T that leave the world price ratio at the
Nash equilibrium level. Beginning at the Nash equilibrium, equation (16) describes the mutual
adjustments in tariﬀs consistent with a ﬁxed world price ratio, and hence the liberalization path
implied by reciprocity.
In order to derive an explicit expression for the iso-world-price locus, note that the trade balance
condition implies: PWex = iy. Using equations (6) and (7) and substituting into equation (16),
we obtain:
PN =
S + µ + ST(1 − µ)
T + γ + ST(1 − γ)
(17)
Equation (17) describes a positive (and convex) relation between S and T, as illustrated by the
PNPN c u r v ei nF i g u r e1 . N =( SN,TN) is the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ pair, through which we
have drawn the indiﬀerence curves corresponding to the Nash equilibrium utility levels, uN and
UN. The liberalization path which conforms to reciprocity involves a downward movement along
the PNPN curve, as indicated by the arrows. The process of liberalization stops at the point where
the mutual beneﬁts from further tariﬀ cuts terminate. In order to derive this point explicitly, we
need to calculate the tariﬀ pair that maximizes each country’s welfare along the Nash iso-world-
price curve, since it also represents the maximum degree of trade liberalization that each country
is willing to achieve according to reciprocity.
10This observation allows BS to demonstrate that reciprocity can be eﬃciency enhancing. The key insight of BS
is the following. As is well known, unilateral tariﬀ setting is ineﬃcient because governments do not bear the full
consequences of their tariﬀ choice, since part of the cost of a tariﬀ increase is shifted to foreign exporters whose
products sell at a lower world price. Hence, there is a negative terms-of-trade externality in tariﬀ setting that induces
governments to impose tariﬀs that are higher than would be eﬃcient. However, since trade liberalization according
to reciprocity leaves world prices unchanged, it neutralizes the terms-of-trade externality induced by unilateral tariﬀ



















Figure 1: Liberalization according to reciprocity
As far as Home is concerned, solve (17) for T to obtain:
T =
S + µ − PNγ
PN(1 + S(1 − γ)) − S(1 − µ)
(18)
Then, substitute (18) into (10) to obtain:
u =
¡
1 − µ + PNγ
¢2 S
PN (1 + S)
2 (19)
It is straightforward to see, from (19), that u is a globally concave function of S and that it
reaches a maximum for S =1 . Hence, the tariﬀ pair that maximizes Home’s welfare according to
10reciprocity is:
SG =1 ; TG =
1+µ − PNγ
PN(2 − γ) − (1 − µ)
(20)
where TG is implied by (18) for S =1 . It is straightforward to show that TG > 1 for PN < 1.
Recall, from (14), that PN < 1 if and only if Home is relatively trade dependent (RTD > 1). Hence,
the agreement that maximizes Home’s welfare under reciprocity is characterized by no restrictions
on imports from Foreign (SG =1 ) in exchange for lower (relative to the Nash equilibrium) but
still positive tariﬀ barriers on its exports to Foreign (TG > 1).
Similarly, to derive the maximum degree of trade liberalization that Foreign is willing to achieve
according to reciprocity, solve (17) for S to obtain:
S =
µ − PN(T + γ)
PNT(1 − γ) − 1 − T(1 − µ)
(21)





PN(1 + T)2 (22)
N o t e ,f r o m( 2 2 ) ,t h a tU is a globally concave function of T reaching a maximum for T =1 . Hence,
the tariﬀ pair that maximizes Foreign’s welfare is:
e TG =1 ; e SG =
µ − PN(1 + γ)
PN(1 − γ) − 2+µ
(23)
where e SG is implied by (21) for T =1 . It is straightforward to show that e SG < 1 for PN < 1.
Hence, since Foreign is relatively trade independent, the agreement that maximizes its welfare
under reciprocity is characterized by no restrictions on imports from Home (e TG =1 ) in exchange
for subsidized exports to Home (e SG < 1).
The tariﬀ pairs G =( SG,TG) and e G =(e SG, e T G) are illustrated in Figure 1. Note that, from
11N to G,b o t hc o u n t r i e sb e n e ﬁt from mutual tariﬀ concessions that conform to reciprocity. At G,
however, the mutual beneﬁts from tariﬀ cuts are terminated, since at this point Home maximizes
its welfare on the Nash iso-world-price locus. Hence, in contrast to Foreign, whose welfare increases
monotonically from G to e G, Home is not willing to liberalize beyond G, which therefore represents
the trade agreement among asymmetric countries that conforms to the GATT’s rule of reciprocity
(henceforth, we will refer to G as the GATT equilibrium).
A striking feature of the GATT equilibrium is that, although the more trade dependent country
(Home) is, by deﬁnition, the country that beneﬁts more from free trade, it is also the one that
stops ﬁrst the process of trade liberalization within the GATT. The intuition for this result is
that, although the trade dependent country has potentially a lot to gain from trade liberalization,
liberalizing according to reciprocity is unappealing to it because such a liberalization is implemented
at the unfavorable Nash equilibrium terms of trade.
Note also, from (20) and (23), that ∂T G
−∂P N > 0 and ∂ e SG
−∂P N < 0. This means that, the greater the
relative trade dependence of Home (i.e., the lower PN), the greater TG and the lower e SG.I nt e r m s
of Figure 1, in the presence of greater country asymmetries, the PNPN locus shifts to the right,
implying a greater distance between G and e G. Hence, the greater the country asymmetries, the
greater the reluctance of the more trade dependent country to liberalize according to reciprocity
relative to its trading partner.
We can now evaluate welfare at the GATT equilibrium. Substituting (20) into (19) and (22)
gives the two countries’ utility at point G:
uG =
¡





(2 − γ)PN − 1+µ
¤£
1 − γPN + µ
¤
4PN
By comparing (24) to (12), it is immediate to see that, for PN =1 , uG = uF and UG = UF.
Hence, the GATT’s rule of reciprocity leads to the free trade outcome when the two countries are
12perfectly symmetric.11 T h i ss p e c i a lc a s ei st h em a i nf o c u so fB S 9 9 ’ sa n a l y s i s .
Matters are quite diﬀerent, however, in the more general case of asymmetric countries. Note,
in particular, that ∂uG
−∂P N < 0 and ∂UG
−∂P N > 0, which implies that uG <u F and UG >U F for
PN < 1. Hence, a striking implication of the GATT’s rule of reciprocity is that it allows the trade
independent country (Foreign) to reach a welfare level greater than in free trade. In contrast, the
trade dependent country (Home) cannot reach the free trade utility level under the GATT’s rule
of reciprocity.
The intuition behind this result is clear from Figure 1. By comparing the GATT equilibrium
(G) to the free trade point at F =( 1 ,1),n o t et h a ta tG, in addition to attaining tariﬀ-free access
to the Home market (SG =1 ), Foreign charges a positive tariﬀ on imports from Home (TG > 1),
and this increases its welfare beyond thef r e et r a d el e v e l .T h ep o s i t i v et a r i ﬀ levied by Foreign also
explains why Home cannot reach the free trade utility level in the GATT equilibrium.
To sum up, we have shown that when asymmetric countries engage in trade negotiations that
conform to the GATT’s rule of reciprocity: (1) the more trade dependent country terminates
negotiations ﬁrst; (2) the greater are the country asymmetries, the more reluctant is the weaker
country to liberalize relative to its trading partner; (3) the weaker country cannot reach the free
trade welfare level; 4) the stronger country attains a higher welfare level than in free trade.
In order to put this last result in perspective, note that, as shown by Mayer (1981) and Kennan
and Riezman (1988), in the presence of large country asymmetries free trade is not in core, which
means that the stronger country can win a tariﬀ war and hence its welfare is higher in the trade
war than in free trade. Further, as shown by Bagwell and Staiger, liberalization according to
reciprocity improves both countries’ welfare relative to the trade war, since it partially removes
the negative terms-of-trade externality. Hence, the received literature suggests that, with large
country asymmetries, since the stronger country is better oﬀ in the trade war than in free trade
(UN >U F), and it is better oﬀ in the GATT equilibrium than in the trade war (UG >U N), then
11Note, from (20), that SG = TG =1for PN =1 .
13it is better oﬀ in the GATT equilibrium than in free trade (UG >U F). Our result is surprisingly
more general, however, since it does not depend on how large are country asymmetries. Put
diﬀerently, even if free trade is in the core, so the stronger country is better oﬀ in free trade than
in the Nash equilibrium (UF >U N), it is still true that this country is better oﬀ in the GATT
equilibrium than in free trade.
The above analysis suggests that the GATT’s rule of reciprocity, by allowing trade independent
countries to improve their welfare relative to both the free trade and the trade war, may distort
negotiated outcomes in favor of stronger countries. In fact, on the one hand, reciprocity allows these
countries to ‘dictate’ the terms of trade at which tariﬀ cuts must be implemented, an advantage
that would be lost under free trade. On the other hand, thanks to the partial trade liberalization
that reciprocity achieves, it also allows these countries to reduce distortions and hence increase
welfare with respect to the trade war.
4 Rules versus Power in Negotiations among Asymmetric
Countries
Following Jackson (1989, pp. 85-88), BS99 (p. 238) distinguish between a ‘power-based’ and a
‘rules-based’ approach to trade negotiations.12 In the former, governments negotiate directly over
tariﬀs without reference to any agreed-upon rules and the outcome of negotiations reﬂects the
bargaining power of trading partners. In the latter, decisions are taken instead with reference to
norms to which both parties have previously agreed. Negotiations within the GATT conform to
a rules-based approach, since they are driven by commonly agreed rules. In contrast, the Nash
bargaining solution represents a natural formalization of a power-based approach since, as noted
by Bagwell and Staiger, any diﬀerence between its outcome and the free trade outcome simply
reﬂects power asymmetries among trading partners. BS argue that a crucial merit of the GATT’s
12See also BS00 on this point.
14rule of reciprocity is that “it serves to mitigate the inﬂuence of power asymmetries on negotiated
outcomes”. As such, reciprocity should favor weak (trade dependent) countries relative to their
stronger trading partners.
In this section, we challenge this view. To make the point, we compare the GATT equilibrium
derived above with the outcome of a Nash bargaining. The Nash bargaining solution is the tariﬀ
pair that maximizes (u − uN)(U − UN), where utility at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
(the trade war) represents the threat point. Following McLaren (1997, p. 409), we do not solve
this problem explicitly. A simpler indirect method of solution is suﬃcient for our purposes. In
this respect, note that the negotiated outcome must be in the core, which means that it is Pareto
eﬃcient and that both countries must prefer it to the trade war. These conditions require that either
the trade dependent country (Home) subsidizes Foreign’s exports (S<1),o rt h et w oc o u n t r i e s
agree on free trade with a side payment from Home to Foreign. In terms of Figure 1, where we
have drawn the eﬃciency locus (the curve labeled EE)13, the Nash bargaining solution is a point
on the lower portion (FE) of the eﬃciency locus. In practice, however, as noted by Dixit (1987)
and McLaren (1997), negative tariﬀsa r ed i ﬃcult to implement, whereas there is a broad spectrum
of forms in which the equivalent of a side payment can be made (see, for instance, the examples
provided by McLaren, 1997 and Perroni and Whalley, 1994).
Using the formulation suggested by McLaren, in which bargaining leads to free trade plus a

























1/2 is the transfer in terms of utils
13As ﬁrst shown by Mayer (1981), S =1 /T describes the eﬃciency locus in tariﬀ-space, since these tariﬀ pairs
equalize the local price ratios.














(UF − UN) (26)



















Finally, using (12) and (15), we can express UB as a function of the endowments γ and µ (a similar





















Note that, although UB is a complicated function of γ and µ, it can be easily interpreted numeri-
cally. We are interested, in particular, in the diﬀerence (UG −UB) between utility under GATT’s
reciprocity rule and under the Nash bargaining solution, in the feasible range of γ and µ.I nt h i s
r e s p e c t ,n o t et h a t ,s i n c eH o m e( F o r e ign) has a comparative advantage in X (Y ) and is relatively
trade dependent (independent), (2) and (3) hold, so we must simultaneously have that γ + µ>1
and
γ(1−γ)
µ(1−µ) > 1. In the appendix, we show that (2) and (3) cannot hold simultaneously for µ<1/2.
Conversely, for µ>1/2, (2) and (3) are both satisﬁed for 1−µ<γ <µ . Hence, the feasible range
of the endowments is:
γ ∈ (1 − µ,µ),µ ∈ (1/2,1) (29)




1−γ) between Home and Foreign’s trade dependence as a
function of γ for various values of µ in the feasible range of γ and µ.N o t e t h a t , f o r g i v e n γ,





















µ = 0.6 γ











Similarly, Figure 3 plots (UG − UB) as a function of γ for various values of µ in the feasible
range of γ and µ. The most striking feature of Figure 3 is that (UG − UB) is always greater
than zero, which means that the trade independent country is always better oﬀ under GATT’s
reciprocity rule than under the Nash bargaining solution. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that
in the Nash bargaining solution the stronger, trade independent country can exploit its greater
bargaining power, it is worse oﬀ than under GATT’s reciprocity rule. Note, also, that since the
Nash bargaining solution is Pareto eﬃcient, the above result also implies that (uG − uB) < 0,
namely, that the weaker, trade dependent country is better oﬀ under a power-based approach
to trade negotiations than under a rules-based approach that conforms to reciprocity. Finally,
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Figure 3: Reciprocity versus Nash bargaining
by comparing Figures 2 and 3 note that Foreign country’s preference for reciprocity is greater the
greater is the trade dependence of Home relative to Foreign, as measured by the absolute diﬀerence
between Home and Foreign’s trade dependence. Hence we conclude that, contrary to what claimed
by Bagwell and Staiger, the GATT’s rule of reciprocity may perversely exacerbate, rather than
mitigating, power asymmetries among countries.
The intuition behind this paradoxical result is that a narrow application of reciprocity to tariﬀ
concessions makes it unappealing to the country less capable of manipulating the terms of trade
through tariﬀs, since it cannot attain what it mainly wishes, namely, a tariﬀ-free access to the
market of its stronger trading partner. In contrast, under a ﬂexible (and eﬃcient) approach to
trade negotiations, by means of non-tariﬀ concessions (formally, a side payment) the weaker country
can attain a tariﬀ-free access to the market of its stronger trading partner.
185 Conclusions
Building on Bagwell and Staiger’s ‘GATT-Think’ and on Kennan and Riezman (1988)’s pure
exchange general equilibrium trade model, we have analyzed the welfare implications of GATT’s
reciprocity rule in the presence of asymmetric countries. As in McLaren (1987), we have focused,
in particular, on asymmetries in power status stemming from diﬀerences in the relative trade
dependence of trading partners. Our basic ﬁndings are the following. 1) Beginning at the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium, both countries gain from trade liberalization according to reciprocity,
although the stronger, less trade dependent country gains disproportionately more. 2) Although
the more trade dependent country is, by deﬁnition, the one that gains potentially more from trade
liberalization, it is also the one that stops ﬁrst the liberalization eﬀort along the liberalization path
that conforms to reciprocity. 3) Reciprocity is so unfavorable to the trade dependent country that it
may be better oﬀ under the Nash bargaining solution (a power-based approach to trade negotiations
that reﬂects power asymmetries among trading partners) than under GATT’s reciprocity rule. 4)
Reciprocity is so favorable to the trade independent country that it may be better oﬀ under this
rule than under free trade or under the Nash bargaining solution. These results have led us to
conclude that GATT’s reciprocity rule may exacerbate power asymmetries among trading partners.
Our analysis helps to make sense of the often heard complaints on the part of developing
countries concerning the fairness of the GATT-WTO. These countries, most of which have a pro-
duction structure highly skewed toward agricultural and textile-leather-apparel products (which
makes them highly trade dependent), often complain, ﬁrst, that in industrial countries agricultural
products are protected by average tariﬀ rates that are 8 times higher than those of industrial prod-
ucts (besides all sorts of non-tariﬀ barriers); second, that although average tariﬀ rates for industrial
products have been drastically reduced, remaining tariﬀs in manufacturing are concentrated in the
textile-leather-apparel sectors.14 Our analysis suggests that this outcome is an implication of the
internal logic of reciprocal tariﬀ concessions in the presence of asymmetric countries.
14See, for instance, Moore (2001) for a summary of the main requests by the developing countries to the WTO.
19Our analysis can also shed light on the so-called new regionalism, i.e., the fact that developing
countries increasingly seek to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with industrial countries. For
instance, the NAFTA, or the Eastward enlargement of the EU are recent, successful, examples of
this new trend in international relations, although, as shown by Baldwin (1997), eﬀorts made by
developing countries to negotiate FTAs with industrial countries have often been frustrated by the
refusal opposed by the latter.15 As emphasized by Park (2000) and Perroni and Whalley (1994),
a distinguishing feature of the new regionalism is that the weaker country negotiates tariﬀ-free
access to the market of its trading partner in exchange for non-tariﬀ concessions. In this respect,
an important point made in this paper is that a trade dependent country can be better oﬀ under
such a ﬂexible and eﬃcient approach to negotiations than under an approach based on reciprocal
tariﬀ cuts, whereas the stronger, trade independent country can be better oﬀ under the latter
approach.
In closing, some important caveats are in order. First, our main results have been derived in
the context of a speciﬁc (although quite popular) trade model. Hence, their general validity is
yet to be proven and is a topic for further research. However, we believe that the mere possibility
that a trade independent country be better oﬀ under GATT’s reciprocity rule than under the
Nash bargaining solution is an interesting result per se, since it suggests that GATT’s reciprocity
rule can highly distort negotiated outcomes in favor of stronger countries. Second, our analysis
was not intended to show that the common practice of seeking a balance of concessions within
the GATT-WTO is, by itself, detrimental to weaker countries. Rather, we have argued that
a narrow application of reciprocity to tariﬀ concessions makes it unappealing to the countries
less capable of manipulating the terms of trade through tariﬀs, since they do not have much
to reciprocate and hence cannot attain what they mainly wish, namely, a tariﬀ-free access to
the markets of their stronger trading partners. In contrast, extending the scope of reciprocity
15Baldwin (1997, p.871) argues that in the early nineties Chile, Brasil, Argentina Uruguay and Paraguay all
formally or informally approached the US with requests for FTAs. The Bush administration refused to negotiate
with these countries, and encouraged instead the creation of a free trade area among them. Hence, Mercosur was
partly created by the Southern Cone countries in order to accomplish a pre-condition for subsequent talks with the
US.
20to include the possibility of non-tariﬀ concessions by developing countries in exchange for tariﬀ
concessions by industrial countries (for instance, in agriculture or in the textile-apparel-leather
sectors) could increase the range of mutually beneﬁcial North-South trade agreements within the
GATT-WTO. In this respect, the recent broadening of the WTO agenda to include negotiations on
services, environmental standards, intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment may
be considered an important step in the right direction. Finally, the GATT-WTO is much more
than reciprocity, on which we have exclusively focused in this paper. In particular, the principle of
non-discrimination has allowed developing countries to beneﬁtf r o mt a r i ﬀ cuts negotiated among
industrial countries. Moreover, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) operated by industrial
countries has further reduced the average tariﬀ rates applicable to imports from least developed
countries. However, as shown, inter alia, by Michalopoulos (1999, p. 48), the GSP and other
preferential schemes have not helped enhance access of least developed countries’ low-skill intensive
exports to industrial countries’ markets16, which makes the issues analyzed in this paper still
relevant.
6A p p e n d i x
6.1 Oﬀer curves
As for Home’s oﬀer curve, consumers maximize u (see equation (1)) subject to the following budget
constraint:
PWcx + Scy = PWγ + S(1 − µ)+( S − 1)iy
where PW is the world relative price of X and (S −1)iy is tariﬀ revenue. Substituting cx = γ −ex
and cy =1− µ + iy into the budget constraint gives the trade balance condition: PWex = iy.
16The reason is that almost all products having tariﬀ ‘peaks’ in developed countries are excluded from the
preferential schemes. See also Cernat, Laird and Turrini (2002) for an analysis of the market access issues faced by
developing countries.
21With Cobb-Douglas preferences as in (1), in which the two goods are weighted equally, utility
is maximized by allocating equal expenditures to each good: PWcx = Scy. Substituting the
expressions for cx and cy, the above can be written as:
PW =
S(1 − µ + iy)
γ − ex
(30)
Finally, plugging (30) into the trade balance condition gives Home’s oﬀer curve (equation (4) in
main text).
Similarly, Foreign consumers maximize U subject to the budget constraint:
TPWCX + CY = TPW(1 − γ)+µ +( T − 1)IX
Substituting CX =1− γ + IX and CY = µ − EY into the budget constraint gives the trade
balance condition: PWIX = EY . Utility is maximized by allocating equal expenditures to each
good: TPWCX = CY . Using the expressions for CX and CY , the above can be written as:
PW =
µ − EY
T(1 − γ + IX)
(31)
Substituting (31) into the trade balance condition gives Foreign’s oﬀer curve (equation (5) in main
text).
6.2 Nash equilibrium tariﬀs
When governments set tariﬀs unilaterally, each chooses a tariﬀ that maximizes the utility of the
representative consumer for given tariﬀ choice by the other government. Hence, the Home govern-
ment maximizes u (equation (10)) with respect to S, while the Foreign government maximizes U

























S(1 − µ)(1 + S(1 − γ))
¸1/2
(35)
Solving (34) and (35) for S and T gives the Nash equilibrium tariﬀs, SN and TN,a si ne q u a t i o n
(13).
Finally, substituting SN and TN into (6) and (7) and using the trade balance condition, PWex =
IX, gives the relative price of X in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, PN, as in equation (14).
6.3 Feasible range of γ and µ
First note that, for x ∈ [0,1], the function x(1 − x) is an inverted parabola symmetric around
x =1 /2, as shown in Figure 4. It follows that, for µ>1/2, γ(1 − γ) >µ (1 − µ) requires that
1 − µ<γ <µ . Note that in this case the condition γ + µ>1 is also satisﬁed. In contrast, for
µ<1/2, γ(1−γ) >µ (1−µ) requires that µ<γ < 1−µ. In this latter case, however, the condition
γ + µ>1 is not satisﬁed. Hence we conclude that our assumptions that Home has a comparative
advantage in X (i.e., γ + µ>1) and that it is relatively trade dependent (i.e.,
γ(1−γ)
µ(1−µ) > 1)i m p l y
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Figure 4: Parameter restrictions
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